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Bonneville County Case No. CV-2012-0001 
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Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho for 
Bonneville County. 
Honorable Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge, Presiding. 
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to fulfill the requirements of the order of 
I 
4 
This appeaJ is taken~ in p2.1L. tiom the FI~~~\_L JLTDG?vfE,~T file s1a.1nped July 30~ 
2013. This Judgment does not appear to be a final judgn1enL pursuant to LR._. C .. P. 
54( a)~ because it cont2ius procedural histor:·__,.. -, ' l nererore 
IT IS 1-iEREB.'{ ORDER_ED tha1 _pursuant to Idaho P.AppelJate F~ules 11 
and l eJ(::2l. the above titled mar.er be. and hereby is, RE\1A_\"DED to the 
Dis1:riC1: Cou:r:: 211d proceedings in this appeal shall be Sl"SPE'\DED to allow for 
entrv of FI:'\ AL Jl"DG\1E~T that does not contain a record of prior 
proceedin°s. CpoD entry of the FI'\AL Jt:DGI'-fE'\T b:- District Court. 1he 
Districr Court Clerk is directed w tnnsmir a certi:-1ed coov of the Fl~'\AL 
JLDG\ff?<T to rhis Court, at ,,hich time this appeal shall proceed accordingly. 
Octobe:: 28, 2013, Order Remanding ro Disrricr Courr (caps in original: emphasis added). The 
ccm:frmning Final }Jd§,1TDent ,;,as c:ntered three (3) days later on Ck~c,ber 3L 2013. (R. Vol. llL p. 
589;. According to this Coun·s Remand Order. once the correCLed final judgment •;,as 
transmined; the appeal ~-shall proceed accordingly.;~ 
Thus. based upon the Order oi Remand, the district coun bad hmited jurisdiction only to 
er1t~r a corrected final judgment in accordance v.,;ith I.R.C.P. 54(a) and did not havejurisdic~ion 
to consider Wickers Second Aforion for Reconsideratior: 
C. THE DISTRICT corRT CORRECTLY DETERMI"l'iED THAT 
\VICKEL'S SECOND MOTIO:'.\ FOR RECO~SIDERATION WAS 
l\-..;TL'V[EL Y. 
This Court's remand order did nm dismiss Wickers appeai or mvalidate the district 
coun·s initial Juh 30. ::'.013. Lr:al Judgmem. Pursuant to the language of the remand order. the 
appeal \~,:as onl~: suspended until a corrected final judgment vvas f11ed; at \\·hicl1 time the appeal 
,vc1uld automatically proceed. As such. the July 30, 20 l 3 Final Judgmerit was s1ill effecrive and 
the time limi1s 10 fi]e a moticin . . . .. ' . 'n r D • 1' ')\'B' h . . d recons1C1eratJon prescr1beG 1n LK.\___.1. l ita)(-J( ) ~ ad aJrea y 
expired, making Wickers Second Jforionfor Reconsideratio11 unti;J1ely. The District Cou_rt \\as 
therefore correct in determining that 'v\:ickel's \1mior:: was not t;mely. 
The district cow~ stated t11e foll0\\·,ing as part of its reasons for ruling that the time limits 
to a motion for reconsideration began to run on July 30~ 2013: 
The imperfections in 1he July 30~ 2013 fir1al judgment \\~ere not a result of actjon 
of tl1e parties. Pa.nies have a right to tbe proper and impartial enforcen1ent of tl1e 
Idaho Rules of Ci\·il Procedure. \1\7.,en a second opportunity to correct 
deficiencies in a party~ s case \;,,,-ould nor exisl but fc,r judicial error~ it \VOuld be 
unjust for this Coun: TO allov .. the party to benefit from the error. This v.ould 
substamially prejudice the opposing party and substamiai prejudice is re-versible 
error. This Court acknov. ledges that the case law addressing final j udgrnent states 
that they are inYalid until they comply with Rule 54(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure and that the jurisdictional 1:imeline in Rule 11 of the Ic.aho Rules of 
Civil Procedure begins with the emry of a final judgmem. However. it is this 
Court's opinion that it [sic] the Supreme Coun never intended to alter the rights of 
the litigants when it remanded deficient final judgments for correct10n. 
Therefore. the founee11 day limit to file a motion for reconsideration began to run 
on July 30, .2013 
R. Vol. EL p. 6:27-.28 (imernal citations c)mirted). 
The district court· s re2soning is sound. The trial coun obsen ed ~hat litigams should not 
be prejudiced due to judicial error. Indeed, it wodd be unjust to alloYv one party to benefit rn the 
detriment of another part; due w a Judicial error. The trial coi..:rf s decision on this issue shou1d 
be aff:rrne~. 
D. THE DISTRICT COLRT DID ~OT ERR I~ STRIKL\G SCO.\lA'S FIRST 
AFFIDAVIT. 
In 1ight of the fact on recons1cierat1on that the district coun ultimately detem1ined that 
Wickel had presented sufficient evidence for Dr. Scoma to have foundmion as to tl1e T,.vin Falls 
standard b.eahh care practice, at first blush, this may appear w be a non-issue. However, 
Chamberlain has appealed from the trial coun·s decision to allow the supplemental affidavit as 
pan of Wickers first motion for reconsiderarion (R. Vol. IIL p. 563 ). lf the :rial coun: erred in 
aUowing the supplemental affidavit of Dr. Scoma, ,hen the only e,·idence regarding the 
appropriate standard cf hea]th care practice 1s Dr. Scoma~s first aiTidavit ,~.'f1ich \\·as stricken bv 
the rrj.al judge. ~.;.s such"' this issue remains releYant IO this aDoeaL 
6 
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p. s statements 
not under 
lO it 1S 
as true. 
It must it can as i:rue 
testimony and determine ,vhether it alle2es facts which. if taken as true. 
would render the testimonv of that witness admissible. 
:,::*** 
Rc1le 56( e) of the Idaho Rules of C iYil Procedure imposes additional requirements 
upon the admission of expen medical testimony submitted in connection with a 
motion for summary judgment. The party offering such evidence must show 
that it is based upon the witness' personal knowledge and that it sets forth 
facts as would be admissible in evidence. The party offering the evidence 
must also affirmatively show that the witness is competent to testify about the 
matters stated in his testimony. Statements that are conclusory or speculative 
do not satisfy either the requirement of admissibility or competency under 
Rule 56(e). 
/\.r1 expert testifying as to the sundard of care in medical malpractice actions ,nust 
shO\Y that he or she is familiar with the standard of care for the particular health 
care professional for the relevant community and time. The expert must also 
state how he or she became familiar with that standard of care. One method 
for an out-of-area expert to obtain knowledge of .:he local srnndard of care is by 
inquiring of a local specialist. 
Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Regional .\1edical Cemer. 137 Idaho 160, 163-64 (2002) ( emphasis 
added). 
--rf the out-of-area expert consults with an Idaho physician to learn the applicable 
standard of care, there must be evidence showing that the Idaho physician knows the 
applicable standard of care ... Ramos v. Dixon. 1-+4 Idaho 32. (2007) (emphasis added). 
Othe:rv-.ise. the om of area expert's testimony lacks fr·,u:ndation that an Idaho physician breached 
the applicable standard of care. 
TI1us~ the district court \\-as correct ,::..rher: it detern1ined 1hat Dr. Sch1nid had no foundation 
to testify because there vvcs 110 factual background 10 show- Ihat Dr. Schmid \x..,,as fami]iar v-/ith tb.e 
applicable standard of care. If there ,;..as no eYidence 1hat Dr. Schmid, the local physician, had 
adequate foundation to testif:,.: regarding the 2.ppropri2.te s:andard of health care practice, then it 
iOllo\\/S that there ½·as no eYidence 1}1a.1 Dr. ScoTDa had ~equisite k:1ov/ledge of 1:he applicable 
s1ar1dard of health care. I1 stand5 to ::ec.sDn that an out-of-state expert like .Dr. Scorna cou]d 01~}-y 
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area an care, must 
care 
1 at 37. 
lt 1S a court ca.ri an 
to was care. 
as a 
. 'h . . , . ~ "l' h . ' h r 1' ' d f . ' . ' . I . ·~ hean care 1s oniy relevant 11 (.) t e laa o i-ao1s srnnaar O~ care was maetermmao1e and(.:'.) 
that T v:in Falls and Idaho F aJls we.,e similar communities during the relevant time period within 
the meaning of Idaho Code § 6-1012 making the Twin Falls sta11dard of care the applicable 
• • O r · ' ' h r ,. D S D standard. - r:.ven assummg arguenao mat r ose t,vo racrs ,\ere true, accornmg lO r. coma, r. 
Schmid simply told him that the Twin falls standard was the same as the national standard of 
health care practice. (R. Vol. L p.130, "And basically, you know, he says, ·The standard of care 
is the narional standard of care. There's no difference whether it be in Twin Falls, Idaho Falls, or 
anywhere else ... ) 
There was no evidence initially proffered by Wickel that either Dr. Scoma or Dr. Schmid 
were actual1y familiar with any alleged national standard of health care practice or that they each 
had the same understanding of what the alleged national Slandard was.~ As a result, there v,;as no 
evidence that Dr. Schmid was familiar with the applicable standard of care enough to convey a 
sufficient foundation for the out-of-area expert, Dr. Scoma, to become familiar with or confirm 
that standard. Wicke! seems to argue that the court should simply take at face value a 
physician's bald statement that he is familiar with the national or local standard of care and that 
more should not be required. Such an argument simply ignores the plain language of Idaho Code 
§ 6-l 012 and this Court's mandate in Ramos that "there must be evidence showing that the Idaho 
physician knows the applicable standard of care." Allowii,g such conclusory statements to lay a 
proper foundation would render the statutory language and coi..m precedent completely 
meaningless. 
1 Chamberlain believes the district court erred in determining that the }dahc Falls standard of care \\'2.S 
indeterminable. See Chamberlain· s t-:ross- .A,ppellant Brief Section III A. 
2 The disr:-ict court correctJy fou,1d that :he :record did not contain auy admissible e\ridence shoviing r!Jar T\vin F a.i]s 
and Idai~o Falls are similar com.munitjes. This is addressed ir: Section IL F . 













Coun acknowledged thar while the standard of care may very likely be the same, there were no 
facts in the record to sustain such a finding. Id. In tbis case, Dr. Scoma failed w make the 
necessary inquiries as to whether and how Dr. Sclnnid was familiar with the Idaho Falls standard 
of care or Tv-iin Falls/alleged national standard of care during January, 2010. As a result, just as 
with Dr. Smith and Dr. Adomato in Dulaney, there \Vas no e-vidence in the record to show that 
Dr. Schmid \:\'as familiar with the applicable standard of care. Since evidence \Vas lacking as to 
the basis for Dr. Schmid's knowiedge on the applicable standard of health care practice, Dr. 
Scoma aiso lacked adequate foundation and the district court correctly found that his affidavit 
testimony was inadmissible. 
E. THE DISTR1CT COURT DID ~OT ERR WHEN IT FOUND THAT 
WICKEL HAD NOT SUBMITTED EVIDENCE GENERATING TR1ABLE 
ISSUES THAT T\\t1N FALLS AND IDAHO FALLS \VERE SIMILAR 
COMMl}~'ITIES. 
Tne district court found that the Idaho Falls standard of care was indeterminable4 and that 
''there \Vere not sufficient facts in the record at the time of Summary Judgment for the Court to 
find that Twin FalJs and Idaho Falls are simiiar communities.'' R. Vol. IIL p. 536: see also R. 
Vol. II. p. 4l2. \:.hcke! contends that the district court·s analysis of the ·'similarity·' rule was 
incorrect. Citing Shipley v. fVilliams, 350 S.\•/.3d 527 (Tenn. 2011), the district court noted that 
pertinent statisticai information such as "community size. hospital size, the number and type of 
medical facilities in the community, and medical services or specialized prac,ices available in the 
area" could be used w establish that similariry. (R. Yol. III. p. 536.) Such information would be 
readily available rn an out-of-area expert through the local consulting physician or a visit to the 
cornmunitv. Judge Shincurling then ruled that ·'to establish that Idaho Falls and Twin Falls \;vere 
-i Chan1berJain bel_iev~es :he district court erred \~.:i1e~: it f(iund :.te Idaho Falls standard of health care practice 10 ~e 
indeterminable and has appea1ed ~bat decision. If this Court cone Jud es tbat the trial cour.: erred in :t!ling that tbe 
Tdaho Fa11s standard of heahh care practice \Vas inCeterrninc.1:-]e~ tben this becomes a non-Jssue because \Vickel 
offered absoh1te~:Y no evidence regarding the Idailc Falls standard of heaith care practice. 
1; 
similar communities m January 2010. evidence from several sources may be presented'' 
including "an expen·s testimony 1:hat establishes 1be similarity. and articulates the factual 
similarii:ies ... (R. Vol. IIL p. 536.) 
This Court has not directly addressed the evidentiary standard for proving similarity of an 
Idaho community. However, at least one previous decision from this Court provide guidance. In 
Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho 32 (2007). the plaintiff was contending that Blackfoot and Idaho 
Falls were both in the same geographical area ordinarily served by 1he hospital in Blackfoot and 
therefore were part of the saiue community with respect to the local standard of care. This Court 
held that "whether Idaho Falls is vvithin the geographical area ordinarily served by the hospital in 
Blackfoot is a factual issue, and there is no evidence in the record on that issue.'' Id. at 35. 
Bv analogv, if there must be facts in the record to determine whether certain communities 
., ~-
are within the same geographical area for standard of care, facts in the record should also be 
required when trying to determine whether communities are similar for the purpose of 
determining the applicable standard of care. Wickel failed lO provide any admissible evidence or 
facts to show that Twin Falls and Idaho Falls \\ere similar communities. 
In this case, \Vickel delayed providing even some statistical information until he filed his 
Motion for Reconsideration. 5 (R. Vol. IJL p. 434-35.) No effort was made bv Wickel to nlace 
" / ~ / _, ~ 
evidence as to cominunirv similarities into the reco;:-ci prior. Howeve, even the statistical 
information provided on Motion for Reconsideration v:as simply assertions made by counsel and 
the statistics were not properly placed into the record. For evidence to be considered it must be 
in the record, and to be in the record. i1 must be prccperly entered. See I.R.C.P. 56ie): Shacocass. 
Inc. v. Arringron CoYISl. Co .. 116 Idaho 460 . .163 i Ct. -\pp. 1989). Statements comained in foe 
5 Wickel d]d :iot pro'vide :his infor.nation to ti½e djstr]c: coun prior :o ~is JforionjOr 1R_ecDnsitiercrion. Ir is 
ChamberlaiI: · s posi'!:jon that ev-·en if it was prGper}y submirted. =~ ",.\:as n.e\\t e\·idence the district cour: should not 
13 
memorandum of cciunsel \Vithout a supporting affidavit should be disregarded. See IRCP 56( e): 
Puckerr v. Oaiqabco, Inc. 132 Idaho 816,979 P.2d 1174 (1999). Even statements made --on 
information and belief" :::annot be utilized but must be disregarded. Trapper Chevroler Co. v 
Hansen. 95 Idaho 436. 510 P .2d 1091 ( 1973). 
Wicke! argued that the district court should have taken judicial notice of the statistical 
information he provided regarding the similarity between Idaho Falls and Twin Falls. (R. Vol. 
IIL p. 434.) However, pursuant to I.R.E. 201. the district court can take judicial notice when 
facts are "not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either ( 1) generally knovm within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination bv 
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned_., 
The inJormation Wickel provided was subject to reasonable dispute, not generally knovrn 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court, and nm capable of accurate and ready 
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. \Vickel 
provided the district couTt with no citation as to the source of the information. How is the 
reliability of this information to be determined if the trial court does not k11ow the source'! Was 
the information today's statistics or for the time frame relevant to this case-the spring of 2010: 
~one of this information \Vas provided to the district court for its consideration. Wickei simpl:" 
wanted the district court to speculate. 
Furthermore. some of the information \Vickel provided vvas simply wrong. \\~ickel 
contends that each community "is" served by one major hospital. However, Idaho Falls was and 
currently is served by two hospitals, EIR..MC and Mountain View Hospital. There were and are 
hospitals in Blackfoot, Rexburg ,and Pocatello. How did the Twin Falls community compare in 
considered u.,_rider Rule 59(e). Chamberlain's position is set forth more fuliy in his Cross-Appellant Brief, Section m 
C. 
14 
the spring of 201 o·, How many genernl surgeons were practicing in Twin Falls in the spring of 
201 O? Of those general surgeons, how many ( other rhan possibly Dr. Schmid) were performing 
hemorrboidectomies using the PPH device? \Ve simply do not bow any of this information on 
the current record. 
Wickel contends that the facr_ that each community has ge::1eral surgeons (who we do nm 
know other than possibly Dr. Schmid) providing hemorrhoid care, including PPH hemorrhoid 
care \Vith Ethicon devices, and that the communities have a similar number of physicians. 
(Appellant Brief p. 32. S 1 R ,. 7 1 IJT 4~ A ~ - ) ee a so i . ,o. ,., p. .J-t-.)). Hov,ever, these claims were 
unsupported by facts in the record ai1d were not facts generally LDO\\ 11 within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the trial court. Likewise, the accuracy of these claims was questionable since no 
sources were provided except for possibly the toral number of physicians at some unknown point 
in time. No effort was made to identify the number of general surgeons in Twin Falls or whether 
the number of overall physicians was the same or similar during the relevant time period. It was 
Wickers responsibility to provide the trial judge with some way to verify that the information 
was accurate and applicable to January. 2010. These were not the types of facts of which the 
district court could take judicial notice. At best they were factually unsupported statements of 
counsel and the district court was correct to disregard them. 
F. THE DISTRICT COGRT WAS CORRECT IN ::.;oT APPL \1NG A 
~ATIONAL STANDARD OF CARE. 
Wicke! contends that the district court should have applied a national standard of care. 
The basis for Wickers argument is tbat the purpose behind the locality rules is antiquated and no 
longer 11eeded gi·ven the state of the medical field and technological adYances. This argument is 
' _1, d ,. b ' h -i., I'' Cd A ' ' nm properly aaaresse' to tr.1s court ased on l.,__e current state oi t,,e cano o e. i--'>l1Y change m 
the law should be addressed to and m1detaken "by tbe legislawre. Ir :s best equipped to perform 
1 -j) 
the fact finding necessar; to address whether a change in that long standing statutory mandate is 
warranted. There are insufficient facts in this record upon wl1ich to undertake such a 
determination. 
Even assliL'lling that this Court were to conclude that he district court should have applied 
some national standard of care, there is no evidence to show that Dr. Scoma or Dr. Schmid were 
familiar with a yet unidentified national standard of care. Dr. Scoma did not state in his affidavit 
if and how he was familiar with this alleged national standard of care. \Vhile Dr. Schmid 
purportedly told Dr. Scoma that the Twin Falls standard was the same as the national standard, 
his srntement "offered no foundation for his opinion" and "is conclusory and without facts to 
support his actual k:110wledge" as the district court correctly noted. (R. Vol. IL p. 412-13.) The 
district court did not err in declining to apply a national standard of care in this case. 
G. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN DlSI\flSSING THE 
ENTIRETY OF \VICKEL'S CASE. 
The district court dismissed Wickel's claims in their entirety. Wickel now contends that 
there were triable issues of fact on his other claims. (Appellant Brief p. 38.) His contention is 
without merit. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-1012. Plaintiff must, "as an essential part of his" case, 
"affirmatively prove by direct expert testimony and by a preponderance of all the competent 
evidence. that the defendant then and there negligently fai1ed to meet the applicable standard of 
health care practice of the community in which such care allegedly v/as or should have been 
provided. as such srnndard then and there existed at the time and place of the alleged negligence 
of such physician and surgeon ... and v,,ith respect to the class of health care pro\·ider that such 
defendant then and there belonged to and in v;hich capacity he ... v.as functioning." Ic:aho Code 
§ 6-1012 (emphasis added). 
\Vith respect to the claim of informed consent Idaho Code § 39-4506 stmes in relevant 
part that "any such consent shall be deemed rnlid ai1d so informed if the health care provider to 
whom it is given or by whom it is secured has made such disclosures and given such advice 
respecting pertinent facts and considerations as would ordinarily be made and given under the 
same or similar circumstances, by a like health care provider of good standing practicing in 
the same community." Idaho Code§ 39-4506 (emphasis added). 
This Court clarified the language of Idaho Code § 39-4506 in Sherwood v. Carter, 119 
Idaho 2 46 (1991 ), srating: 
\Ve hold that I.C. § 39-4304 sets forth and requires an objective, 
medical-community standard for determining whether a patient has been 
adequately informed prior to giving consent for medical treatment. A valid 
consent must be preceded by the physician disclosing those pertinent facts to the 
patient so that he or she is sufficiently aware of the need for, the nature oi: and the 
significant risks ordinarily involved in the treatment to be provided in order that 
the giving or withholding of consem be a reasonably informed decision. The 
requisite pertinent facts to be disclosed to the patient are those which would 
be given by a like physician of good standing practicing in the same 
community. 
Id. at 256, ( emphasis added) ( overruled on other grounds by Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'! 
Afed. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889 (2011)). Under Idaho Code§ 39-4506 and Sherwood, it is clear that 
there must be some evidence about what facts a like health care provider of good standing 
practicing in the same community would disclose and that there was a failure to disclose such 
facts. 
Through Dr Scoma, Wick el claims ( 1) Chamberiain' s failure to diagnose the anorectal 
fissure as the cause of Vii ck el :-s pai11 \Vas a breach of the 5ra11dard of care; (2) Charnberlain 
Degligemly perforr;-:ied the hemorrhoidectom: using the PPH device: Chamberlain \·iolated 
the s~andard of care b\· also doing a snhinctcrotcmv after inserting the PPH de\-ice; (4) 
Chamberlain's treatment of the fissure and the fistula that later developed violated the standard 
of care; and (5) Chamberlain failed to obtain informed consem. (R. Vol. L pp. 97-98.:) 
Facts in the record demonstrate that prior to undergoing his hemorrhoidectomy, Wicke] 
told Dr. Chamberlain that he wanted Dr. Chamberlain to do whatever needed to be done to make 
sure J:-,js problems \Vere corrected. (R. Vol. I, p. 56.) \Vickel testified as follows: '· .. .if be could 
fix the hemorrhoid pain I was haying, yes, that's what I wanted him to do. If that was the way 
to treat them, to treat hemorrhoids, I warned to have surgery, if he felt that's the way to get rid of 
them." (R. Vol. I, p. 68) (TVickel Depa., p. 61, 11. 8-13) (Emphasis added.). In addition, the risks 
associated with a sphincterotomy that Chamberlain would have informed Wickel about are the 
same as those risks associated with a hemorrhoidectomy and which he informs patients about in 
any rectal procedure. (R. Vol. L p. 165) (Chamberlain Depa, p. 53, 11. 15-p. 54, 11. 14). 
Wickel signed to wTinen consent forms. One authorized Chamberlain to provide Wickel 
"with a.11y a11d all necessary evaluations and/or treatments." (R. Vol. I, p. 74.) The other 
specifically informed Wickel that in addition to performing surgery on the hemorrhoids, 
Chamberlain was going to perform a ·'diagnostic evaluation of rectal problem." (R. Vol. I, p. 
76). According to that consent form, initialed and signed by Wickel he was informed of the risks 
and consented to Chamberiain "performing whatever different surgery or procedure they deem 
necessary or advisable:· Id. 
\Vii:h the written consents and ctirecnon fro_rn Mr. Wickel in hand, Dr. Chamberlain 
performed the rectal e:-:amination under 2.n.:sthesia and the . ' 1nternai and external 
hemorrhoidectomy on Janua,y 8, 2010. \R. Vol. L p. . (Chamberlain Depo.~ p. 43~ lL 7-] 1). 
This required puning \1r. 1-A~ickel under the effects of a gen.erai endotracheal anesthetic. During 
the procedure .. in additic,n to the hemorrhoids~ Dr. Chamberlain determined that ?vir. ·\1·/icke1 had 
a fissure Vir·h]ch \:Vas 11ot preYiously diagnosed in pan dt:c to the fact that Chcu--n·be::-lain -:-.,-as ur1able 
18 
to perform a complete anal examination because of Wickel' s complaint of pain. (R. Vol. I, p. 
Based upon Mr. Wickel' s stated desire to have done wharever was needed to correct his 
condition and to avoid the additional risks of bringing Mr. Wickel out of anesthesia to discuss 
the risks a.rid alternatives and then, some days or weeks later, putting him under anesthesia again, 
Dr. Chamberlain performed a fissurectomy and imemal lateral sphincterotomy (ILS)--the gold 
standard for treatment of a fissure. (R. Vol. L p. 55-56.) (Chamberlain Depo., p. 52, 11. 12 - 23: 
p. 54, 11. 25-p. 55, 11. 20). 
Chamberlain's second motion for summary judgment requested that all claims be 
dismissed for lack of any required expert testimony to establish the appropriate standard of care 
or his violation of those standards. Wickel presented absolutely no evidence as to the applicable 
local standard of care in either Idaho Falls or Twin Falls pertaining to ( 1) diagnosing anorectal 
fissure; (2) performing a sphincterotomy or LIS; (3) treatment of a fissure or fistula; and/or (5) 
obtaining informed consent for an US under the same or similar circumstances. Wickel failed to 
present any admissible testimony or evidence about what facts a like health care provider of 
good standing practicing in the same community would disclose. There is no evidence that a 
health care provider of good standing practicing in the same commurutv would not have 
performed the fissurectomv and lateral internal sphincterotomy under the saiue or similar 
circumstances. 
Dr. Scoma's testimony lacks foundation because there is no evidence in the record to 
sho·vv 1bat he \Vas farniliar with the local standard of care related to a11y of these issues. He never 
s:poke to any general surgeons in Idaho Falls about tbese issues. 1-here is no e-vidence that the 
stcndard of care in Idal10 Falls \'Vas :ndeterminable as to these issues. Even if there \,\·asw I)r. 
Scorr:.a res:ified that ~e never spoke will: Dr. Schmid abom any of these issues. As a resuh, there 
l9 
is no evidence to show that he is familiar with the applicable standard in Idaho Falls or Twin 
Falls as to any of these issues. Given the lack of testimony and evidence as to the sta.11dards of 
care on these issues, the district court did not err in dismissing all of Wickers other claims. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Wickel's Second Motion for Reconsiderarion was untimely filed and the district court 
correctly found that it did not have jurisdiction to hear it based upon the directives in this Court's 
Remand Order. Wickel also failed to request a continuance and failed to raise a.11y objection to 
the siinilar communities issue if he believed it was improperly included in Chamberlain's Second 
,Motion for Summary Judgment. The district court correctly ruled that Wickel waived any 
argument or objection to its inclusion pursuant to this Court's ruling in State v. Rubbermaid. 
The district court did not err in striking Scoma's Affidavit. It is clear from the affidavit 
that there was no evidence showing how Dr. Sch1nid knew the applicable standard of health care 
practice. As a result, there was no evidence that Dr. Scoma was familiar ,vith the applicable 
standard of health care practice, resulting in Dr. Scoma lacking proper foundation for his expert 
op1mons. 
\Vickel also failed to put any evidence into the record that Twin Falls and Idal10 Fal1s 
were similar communities. He simply wanted the distric, court to believe his concJusory 
statements or otherwise rely on speculation. Accordingly, the district court was correct when it 
found that Wicke! had not submined e\'idence generating triable issues that Twin Falls and Idaho 
Falls were similar communities. In addition, there vvas no basis for the district court 10 apply a 
national srnndard of care. Wickers argument about antiquated locality rules is an issue properly 
raised before the State legislature_ and not :his Court. 
Fin2J];'., \\T}ckel :failed to present any admissible testimony or e\¥idence to sho\Ai/ t:J1at 
Cha.11berlain breached t.he appbcable standard of~ealth care practice v,,:ith regard to a11 of the rest 
of his claims against Dr. Cha_rnberlain. Dr. Scoma·s affidavits fail to show how he Yrns familiar 
with the local standard on the issues separate from the hemorrhoidectomy using PPH. 
Consequently, the expert testimony required to show that Chamberlain allegedly breach the 
standards of care pertaining to those issues is completeiy missing. Therefore, the district court 
did not err in dismissing all of Wicke!· s remai1ring claims. This Court should therefore affirm 
the district court's decisions and deny Wickel's appeal. 
DATED this ~l day of August, 2014 
~)l. i 
<I/ I ~ 
~- ~ . . ~L . 
. . --------
Richard R. Friess, Esq. / 
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